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RoYER 1.1. UARTER 
[L. A. No. 21857. In Bank. July 10, 1951.J 
MARY C. ROYER, Respondent, v. HELENA CAR~ER. 
Appellant. 
[1] 
[2] 
[3] 
U] 
[5] 
Vendor and Purchaser-Performance of CO!ltract-AbilitJ to 
Convey.-In an action for breach of a contract to purchase fl!al 
propl!rty, defendant cannot successfully urge that hecausl! a 
policy of title insurance was not issued plaintill failed to prove 
that she was able to convey the property in accord with the 
terms of the contract, where plaintiff deposited all the neces-
sary papers in escrow and there is substantial evidence that 
a policy of title insurance could and would have been issued had 
defendant not repudiated the contract. 
Id.-Forfeiture of Purchaser'S Interest-Vendor's Option or 
Right of Election.-On the 'len dee's breach of a contract to 
purchase real property, the vendor has the right to retain the 
down payment as a set-otl against her &etual dlim,es, inde-
pendently of any right she may have under a clause in the 
contract giving her the option to retain the down payment 
as consideration for the execution of the contract. 
Id.-Forfeiture of Purchaser'S Interest-Vendor's OptioOl or 
Right of Election.-In an action forbreach of a . contract for 
the purchase of real' property, the court is justified in finding 
that plaintiff retained the down payment to apply on the 
damages sustail.led on account of the breach, where she in-
formed defendant of her intent to hold defendant for actual 
damages, and her conduct was not inconsistent with the election 
of that remedy in preference to the option provided in the 
contr8~t to retain the down payment as consideration for the 
execution of the agreement. 
Id.-Mistake-Burden of Proof.-In an action for breach of 
a contract to purchase real property, the burden is on defend-
ant to prove her affirmative defense that she entered the 
contract under the mistaken belief that a clause giving plain-
till the option to retain the down payment would limit her 
liability to the amount of the down payment and that plaintiff 
knew of the mistake on her part (Code Civ. Proe., § 1981). 
Icl.-Mistake-Findings and Conclusions.-In an action for 
breach of a contract to purchase real property, the court may 
reasonably conclude that defendant did not enter into the 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Vendor and Purchaser, § 152; 
[2, 3] Vendor and Purchaser, § 131; [4) Vendor and Purchaser, 
§ 57; [5) Vendor and Purchaser, § 58; lG-12] Vendor and Pur-
chaser, § 307. 
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contract under the mistaken belief that a clause giving plain-
tiff the option to retain the down payment also limited 
defendant's liability, where the clause did not purport to 
limit her liability, and where her testimony as to her concern 
over her liability if she could not complete performance of 
the contract indicates that she knew that one who entera 
into a contract may be liable in damages for its breach. 
[6] Id.-Vendor'a Remedies-Damagea.-In an action for breach 
of a contract to purchase real property, the court's computa-
tion of damages based on a resale price three months after 
defendant's breach is erroneous, where it fails to make adjust-
ment for an admitted decline in the market during that period. 
[7] Id.-Vendor's Bemedies-Damages.-In an action for breach· 
of a contract to purchase real property, the value of the prop-
erty to the seller is to be determined as of the date of the 
breach. 
[8] Id.-Vendor's Bemedies-Damages.-Civ. Code, § 3353, has no 
application in the computation of damages in an action for 
breach of a contract to purchase real property. 
[9] ld.-Vendor's Bemedies-Damagea.-The measure of damages 
under Civ. Code, § 3307, is designed to assure to the vendor of 
rea) property the benefit of his bargain, and additional 
damages should not be allowed for expenses that would have 
been ;,pcurred had the contract been performed. (Civ. Code, 
§ 3358.) 
[10] Id.-Vendor's Bemedies-Damages.-When, as a natural con-
sequence of the vendee's breach, the vendor of real property 
must lDcur additional expenses in order to realize the benefit 
of his bargain, such additional expenses may be recovered in 
addition to the damages provided for in Civ. Code, § 3307. 
(Disapproving contrary expressions in Morgan v. Dabble, 43 
Cal.App. 116, 184 P. 704, and Maloney v. Houston, 51 Cal. 
App. 585, 197 P. 661.) 
[11] Id.-Vendor'a Bemedies-Dama.ges.~In an action for breach 
of a contract to purchase real property, by virtue of which 
breach plaintiff's liability for a commission under her broker-
age agreement was reduced, the court, in computing the addi-
tional damages caused by defendant's breach, should allow 
an amount equal to the difference between the cost of selling 
the property at its value at the time of the breach and the 
amount by which the anticipated expenses of the first sale 
were reduced by defendant's breach. 
[7] Measure of damages for purchaser's breach of contract to 
buy real property, note, 52 A.L.B. 1511. See, also, 25 CalJur. 716; 
55 Am.Jur. 918. 
J'l C-acl-li 
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(12] Id. - Vendor's "'Remedies - Damages. - In fixing the damages 
for the breach of a contract for the sale of real property, the 
court should make a deduction for the value of personal 
property agreed to be sold with the realty in the first sale but 
not included in the second. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Orlando H. Rhodes, Judge. Judgment for 
plaintiff reversed with directions. 
Action for damages for breach of contract to purchase 
real property. Judgment for plaintiff reversed with direc-
tions. 
Oliver B. Schwab and Arthur Livingston for Appellant. 
Kenneth D. Holland for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant has appealed fJ;:pm a judgment 
for damages for breach of a contract to purchase real prop-
erty. On August 23, 1948, defendant agreed to buy plain-
tiff's house and lot for $24,000 and paid $1,000 down. Be-
cause she was unable to secure the additional funds necessary 
to complete the purchase, defendant defaulted on the contract, 
and plaintiff put the property back on the market late in 
September. The following December plaintiff was able to 
resell the property for $18,500. The trial court awarded 
damages equal to the difference between the contract price 
and the price at which the property was resold plus the ex-
penses incurred in connection with the first sale, but less the 
amount of the down payment. 
[1] Defendant contends that because a policy of title 
insurance was not issued, plaintiff failed to prove that she 
was able to convey the property in accord with the terms of 
the contract. There is no merit in this contention. Plaintiff 
deposited all the necessary papers in escrow, and there is 
substantial evidence that a policy of title insurance could 
and would have been issued had defendant not repudiated 
the contract. 
[2] The contract provided "That should the purchaser 
fail to pay the balance of the purchase price, or fail to com-
plete the purchase, as herein provided, the amounts paid 
hereon may, at the option of the seller, be retained a.<; the 
20nsideration for the execution of this agreement by the 
seller." Defendant contends that under this provision plaia-
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tiff had an option to retain the down payment instead of 
suing for damages and that she exercised this option by re-
taining the deposit. The retention of the deposit was not, 
however, inconsistent with plaintiff's right to elect to hold 
defendant responsible for damages. Independently of any 
rights she may have had under the option clause itself (see 
Civ. Code, §§ 1670, 1671; Freedman v. The Rector, etc. of St. 
Matthias Parish, ante, p. 16 [230 P.2d 629]), plaintiff had 
the alternative right to retain the down payment as a setoff 
against her actual damages. (Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Ca1.2d 36, 
40 [216 P.2d 13].) Her retention of the money was consistent 
with the choice of either remedy. [3] Since she informed 
defendant of her intention to hold defendant liable for aetual 
damages, if the latter did not perform the contract, and since 
her conduct was not inconsistent with the election of that 
remedy, the trial court was justified in finding that the "de-
posit was retained by her to apply on damages sustained by 
reason of defendant's breach of contract." 
As an affirmative defense defendant pleaded that she entered 
the contract under the mistaken belief that the clause giving 
plaintiff the option to retain the down payment would limit 
her liability to the amount of the down payment and that 
plaintiff knew of this mistake on her part. The sale was nego-
tiated through the joint efforts of Mrs. Ries, a real estate 
broker to whom plaintiff had given an exclusive listing, and 
Mr. Medica, a real estate agent who worked for another broker. 
Defendant had sought Mr. Medica's assistance in locating an 
apartment, but he succeeded in interesting her in buying plain-
tiff's property instead. After visiting the property she re-
turned to Mr. Medica's office and discussed with him the possi-
bility of its purchase. On conflicting evidence the trial court 
found that Mr. Mediea had pointed out the clause giving the 
seller the option to retain the down payment and "stated to 
defendant that in his opinion if she did not complete the pur-
chase of said real property she would only lose . the $1,000 
deposit she was to put up." The trial court also found, how-
ever, that "said statement of Mr. Medica's was not relied 
upon by defendant and did not furnish any inducement for 
her to enter into said contract," and that it Wt.S not true that 
"Defendant mistakenly believed that the purchase agreement 
that she entered into and the contract as reduct'd to writing 
provided and meant that the deposit could be retllined by the 
seller but that such a forfeiture was the full ex~nt of the 
defendant's obligation thereunder." 
) 
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[4] It is unnecessary to consider defendant's contention 
that Mr. Medica was plaintiff's subagent whose knowledge 
was imputable to plaintiff, for in any event the burden Was 
upon defendant to prove that she was mistaken as to the 
meaning of the contract (Code Civ. Proc., § 1981), and the 
trial court was not required to find in accord with her testi-
mony on this issue. (Hutk v. Katz, 30 Ca1.2d 605, 609 [184 
P.2d 521] ; Blank v. Coffin, 20 Ca1.2d 457, 461-462 [126 P.2d 
868].) [5] Moreover, the clause giving plaintiff an option 
to retain the down payment as consideration for the execution 
of the agreement did not purport to limit defendant's liabil-
ity. Rather it provided an additional remedy for plaintiff. 
Defendant's testimony as to her concern over her liability, 
if she could not complete performance of the contract, 
indicates that she knew that one who enters a contract may 
be liable in damages for its breach. The trial court could 
reasonably conclude that since defendant had such knowledge 
she did not enter. into the contract under the mil!$6ken belief 
that the clause giving an optional remedy to plaintiff also 
limited defendant's liability. 
[6] The trial court awarded damages based on a finding 
that the value of the property to plaintiff under Civil Code, 
section 3307,1 was equal to the resale price of $18,500. The -
resale took place approximately three months after the date 
of defendant's breach, and it is undisputed that the value 
of the property was declining during that period. Various 
witnesses gave their opinions as to the value of the property 
at the time of the breach, the lowest estimate being $22,500. 
Although the resale price was evidence of the value of the 
property to plaintiff at the time of the resale (Bagdasarian v. 
Gragnon, 31 Cal.2d 744, 757-758 [192 P.2d 935]), the trial 
court's failure to make an adjustment for the admitted de-
cline in the market was erroneous, unless the damages are to 
be computed as of the date of resale rather than as of the date 
of the breach. Plaintiff contends that under Civil Code, sec-
tion 3353,11 it was proper for the trial court to determine the 
value as of the later date. 
1"The detriment caused by the breach of an agreement to purchase 
an estate in real property, is deemed to be the excess, if any, of the 
amount which would have been due to the seller, under the contract, 
~ver the value of the property to him." 
"'In estimating damages, the value of property to a seller thereof 
is deemed to be the price which he could have obtained therefor in the 
market nearest to the place at which it should have been accepted by 
the buyer, and at such time after the breach of the contract as would 
have au1liced, with reasonable ~ence. for the lIeller to e1feet & resaIe." 
. 
) 
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Under the provisions of section 3353 the value of the prop· 
erty is to be determined, not as of the date of the breach of 
the contract, but as of such time thereafter II as would have 
sufficed, with reasonable diligence, for the seller to effect a 
resale." Defendant contends, however, that the reference to 
"the market nearest to the place at which [the property] 
should have been accepted" makes clear that the section was 
intended to apply only to sales of personal property. 
The language defendant relies upon is apposite to con-
tracts for the sale of personal property. It sets forth the 
elements of performance of such contracts, and indicates a 
physical change of possession at a particular place. Such 
language does not describe any of the duties of a vendee of 
an estate in real property. At most such a vendee is obliged 
to accept a conveyance; he need not take possession of the 
property itself. Similarly the reference to the nearest market 
indicates concern with personal rather than rea] property. 
The seller must deliver the property to a certain place, and 
if the buyer refuses to accept it the seller may then dispose 
of it in the nearest market. Thus the language of the statute 
itself suggests that it is limited to sales of personal property. 
Before the adoption of the Uniform Sales .Act ( Civ. Code, 
§ 1721 e't seq.) in ] 931, section 3353 was invoked by the courts 
to define the term "value to the seller" as used in former 
Civil Code, section 3311, which stated the measure of damages 
for breach of an agreement to accept and pay for personal 
property. (See, e. g., H~"ll v. McKay, 94 Cal. 5. 17-18 [29 P. 
406].) [7] In cases involving sales of real property, how-
ever, it has generally been held that the value of the property 
to the seller is to be determined as of the date of the breach. 
(Drew v. Pedlar, 87 Cal. 443, 450-451 [25 P. 749, 22 Am.St. 
Rep. 257] ; Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Ca1.2d 36, 39-40 [2]6 P.2d 
13]; Dean v. Hawes, 21 Cal.App. 350, 355 [131 P. 8851; 
Shurtleff v. Marcus Land etc. 00., 59 Cal.App. 520, 523 
[211 P. 244] ; Oaspar Lumber 00. v. Stowell, 37 Ca1.App.2d 
58,61 [98 P.2d 744] ; Employees' Participating Assn. v. Pine, 
91 Cal.App.2d 299, 301 [204 P.2d 965] ; see,also, McCormick 
on Damages, § 186, pp. 710-711; anno., 52 A.L.R. 1511, 1512.) 
Thus the rule that has been consistently followed in de-
termining the damages for breach of an agreement to pur-
chase an estate in real property is inconsistent with the provi-
sions of section 3353. Although its applicability in such cases 
has apparently never been directly ad:il1dicated. the fact that 
it was regularly invoked in cases involving personal property 
) 
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convinces us that it was not considered in real property cases 
because it was regarded as inapplicable, not because it was 
overlooked. [8] We conclude that section 3353 has no ap-
plication to sales of real property, and that the damages should 
therefore be computed as of the date of the breach of the agree-
ment to purchase the property. 
Defendant contends that the trial court also erred in allow-
ing as additional damages $45 in escrow charges, $40 in title 
charges, and $420 in broker's fees paid in connection with the 
first sale. [9] When, as under section 3307, the measure 
of damages is designed to assure to the vendor the benefit 
of his bargain, additional damages should not be allowed for 
expenses that would have been incurred had the contract 
been performed. To do so would place the vendor in a better 
position than he would have been in had there been no breach. 
(Civ. Code, § 3358.) Thus, plaintiff would have paid the 
'}xpenses from the proceeds of the sale had the contract been 
performed. If she is given the equivalent of the .proceeds. of 
the sale under section 3307 she is not also entitled to expenses 
that she would have incurred in any event. 
[10] In many cases, however, the vendee's breach may 
make it necessary for the vendor to incur additional expenses 
to realize the benefit of his bargain. Given the rule that the 
value of the property to the seller under section 3307 is ordi-
narily thc market value at the time of the breach (Employees' 
Participating Assn. v. Pine, 91 Cal.App.2d 299, 301 [204 P.2d 
965], and cases cited), injustice could result if the vendor 
were not allowed to recover damages for additional expenses 
caused him by the vendee's breach. Thus in a case where the 
property is sold at the market value and that value remains 
constant until after the breach, and the property is then 
resold at the same price, the vendor could recover no damages 
under section 3307. He would be forced to pay, however, in 
addition to the expenses of the first sale, the expenses of the 
resale. When such additional expenses are the natural conse-
quence of the breach, they may be recovered in addition to 
those provided for in section 3307. (Yocum v. Taylor, 50 
Cal.App. 294, 295 [195 P. 62] ; accord, King v. Globe Grain 
etc. Co., 58 Cal.App. 105, 114 [208 P. 166], adopting same rule 
with respect to former Civil Code, section 3311 ; see 5 Corbin 
on Contracts, § 1036, p. 186.) The statements in Morgan v. 
Dibble, 43 Cal.App. 116 [184 P. 704]. and Maloney v. H ou.~ton, 
51 Cal.App. 585 [197 P. 661], indicating that section 3307 
provides the exclusive measure of damages were not nee-
) 
) 
July J951] ROYER v. CARTER 
[37 C.2d 544; 233 P.2d 5391 
551 
essary to the decisions ill thmw cases and are disapproved. 
[11] It does not follow that the actual expenses of the 
first sale will necessarily be equal to the additional expenses 
caused by the vendee's breach. If all of the contemplated 
expenses of the first sale are actually paid and the property 
does not change in value, ordinarily the additional expense 
of reselling made necessary by the breach will be equal to 
those incurred in the first sale. In the present case, however, 
it appears that all the contemplated expenses of the first sale 
were not paid and that the cost of reselling at the market value 
at the time of the breach would have been less than the cost of 
selling at the contract price. Under the terms of her agree-
ment with the broker plaintiff was not obligated to pay the 
full commission on the first sale in case of defendant's default. 
She paid only $420, thus saving $780 of the anticipated ex-
pense of the first sale. 
Since the cost of a sale under the usual brokerage con-
tract is 5 per cent of the purchase price, what that cost 
would have been at the time of defendant's breach cannot be 
determined in the .9bsence of a finding of the market value of 
the property at that time. On retrial, the trial eourt, in com· 
puting the additional damages caused by defendant's breach, 
should allow an amount equal to the difference between the 
cost of selling the property at its value at the time of the 
breach and $780, the amount the anticipated expenses of the 
first sale were reduced by defendant's default. 
[12] In fixing the damages on the basis of the resale price, 
the trial court failed to make a deduction for the value of 
certain personal property included in the first sale but not 
in the second. On retrial the value of the personal property 
agreed to be sold with the realty should be taken into considera-
tion. 
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed to 
retry only the issue of damages in accordance with the views 
expressed herein. Each party is to bear her own costs on this 
appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., 
concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I eoncur in the judgment and generally in 
Justice Traynor's opinion. In so doing, however, I deem it 
proper to note that I consider the resale price obtained by 
plaintiff as constituting some evidence of the value of the 
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property to her on the date of the breach. The fact that there 
,vas a falling market on and following that date must be con-
sidered in connection with the price finally obtained in order 
to estimate the value as of the date of breach, but that fact 
also must be considered as affecting the price reasonably 
obtainable by a seller who first learns on the date of breach 
that a new purchaser must be obtained. 
In other words, an appraiser in estimating, and a court in 
finding, the value to the seller on the date of breach must 
necessarily take into consideration the fact that some appre-
ciable time is ordinarily required to find a purchaser ready, 
able and willing to buy. The value to the seller on the date 
of breach should be the price obtainable on an offering of the 
property on that date with allowance for a reasonable time 
within which to find a purchaser. Certainly the seller who 
does not breach his contract should not have to anticipate 
a breach by the contracting purchaser nor should such a seller 
ha"e to stand all or any part of the loss nec~ri1y flowing 
from the purchaser's breach. Thus, if the price finally ob-
tained in a falling market is the best price which reasonably 
couJd be procured, with due diligence, on an offering made as 
of the date of breach, the value to the seller as of such date 
would be no more than the price actually obtained. 
